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I. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SSTR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis asks, “How can civilian and military 
organizations facilitate the development of social capital 
with and between competitive ethnic networks during 
Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
operations?”1 The question, more simply put, is “how can 
civilian and military outsiders foster social capital among 
indigenous populations in a post-war environment?” This 
question is timely, given current SSTR efforts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Humanitarian and military efforts 
frequently focus on human and physical capital intervention 
without due consideration for social capital. As an example 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified in 
June ’04 before the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
stressed money and the concern for human capital—the 
development of individuals: 
It's worth pointing out that Iraq has already 
committed--and this is, I think, a significant 
figure--$20 billion of its own resources. That's 
a pretty impressive number--$20 billion of Iraqi 
resources that have already gone into funding the 
government and funding reconstruction, including 
350,000 teachers, 100,000 doctors, more than 
2,000 schools, almost 250 hospitals, over a 
billion dollars in improving electricity 
infrastructure.2   
                     
1 D. D. Directive, 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, 
Security," Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 28 (2005)  
2 "Testimony as Delivered to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
the Transition in Iraq," U.S. Department of Defense Speeches, 25 June 
2004 [database on-line]; available from http://www.questia.com/ 
PM.qst?a=o&d=5007384420, accessed April 26, 2007. 
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The infusion of funds to develop physical and human 
capital—essential as they are to nation building—has taken 
precedence as a contemporary intervention strategy. This 
thesis examines and proposes a different approach: an 
intervention strategy that emphasizes a cycle of 
reciprocity and the development of networks where bridging 
social capital can develop and grow. The basic premise is 
that the development of social capital is the key to long-
term security and stability. 
Social capital (the definition of which will be 
explained in greater detail in the next chapter) is defined 
as “features of social organization such as networks, 
norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit.”3 Within this definition are 
two types of social capital: bonding social capital which 
exists between families, tribes and similar social classes; 
and bridging social capital which manifests itself between 
unlike groups.4 
An examination of the literature on social capital and 
the experiences of the author in organizing the Harvest 
Initiative in Gnjilane, Kosovo (July-September 1999) and 
observing the “Village of Hope” in Mosul, Iraq (January-
December 2004) suggest that a network-centric intervention 
strategy that fosters a positive cycle of reciprocity among 
in-country groups promotes SSTR goals more so than a 
strategy that does not.  
The organization of the thesis is as follows: the 
remainder of this chapter proposes a theoretical framework 
                     
3 R. D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital," 
Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 67. 
4 Ibid. 
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for a social capital intervention strategy; Chapter II 
reviews the evolving definition of social capital and the 
literature of the key contributors in the field; Chapter 
III explains the comparative case study methodology 
employed and the strengths and limitations of this 
methodology; Chapter IV presents the events of the two case 
studies (the author’s personal involvement in the Wheat 
Harvest in Kosovo in 1999 and the Village of Hope in Mosul, 
Iraq in 2004); Chapter V analyzes, compares and contrasts 
the events of the two case studies. The final chapter 
presents conclusions from the case studies and 
recommendations for a social capital-based intervention 
strategy for SSTR. 
B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework of this thesis is built on 
fostering “bridging” social capital between entities with 
strong “bonding” social capital (Figure 1). Some take issue 
with this dichotomy, noting that external ties (bridging 
social capital) at one level of analysis are actually 
internal ties (bonding social capital) at higher levels of 
analysis.5 One must keep such cautions in mind when 
determining whether bridging social capital has been 
produced in an ad hoc SSTR network. 
Overwhelmingly, the primary lesson of the United 
States military in Afghanistan and Iraq has been one of 
seeking to establish the norm of reciprocity: Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are massive laboratories 
of human relations based on tit-for-tat gamesmanship in 
                     
5 Adler, Social Capital: Prospects, 35. 
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seemingly zero-sum environments. When the military—as well 
as civilian governmental and non-governmental relief 
organizations—bring considerable resources into regions 
starved for economic and material aid, the race is on for 
the interventionists to impose order and generate popular 
support, while the ethnically-divided population races to 
gain as much assistance as possible. Herein lays the 
conceptual framework: a cycle of positive reciprocity 
evolves between the indigenous population (further sub-
divided along competing ethnic/religious lines) and the 
providers of aid. A cycle of reciprocity must further 
develop among the ethnically-divided populations 
themselves. The initial unit of analysis for the conceptual 
framework is the relationship between the population and 
the interventionists. The secondary unit of measure must be 
the relationships among individuals in the competing ethnic 
groups. This micro level of analysis within groups enables 
a macro level of analysis between groups. 
C. RECIPROCITY AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework is held together by the norm 
of reciprocity. Positive reciprocity (PR) at its simplest 
level is a mutually beneficial system of trust. This system 
of trust contains an element of risk, as indicated in Piotr 
Sztompka’s definition of trust: “trust is a bet about the 
future contingent actions of others.”6 Positive reciprocity, 
from Sztompka’s perspective, requires that one party places 
a bet—i.e., demonstrates trust to another party that may 
either reciprocate that trust (yielding to the sense of
                     
6 P. Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory, Cambridge University 
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obligation that arises when trust is given) or choose to 
“opt out” of the cycle. Neutrality in the face of 
demonstrated trust is rare and appears contrary to human 
nature. Examples from ancient history support this view, as 
Cicero stated, “There is no duty more indispensable than 
that of returning a kindness,” and warned, “all men 
distrust one forgetful of a benefit.”7 The propensity for 
opting out of the cycle of reciprocity has much to do with 
a society’s circumstances relative to Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Human Needs (discussed in Chapter VI). Societies with a 
high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency (and less war 
damage) have more latitude for opting out of a trust 
arrangement than societies which are scrabbling for the 
basics of existence.  
Competitiveness must be taken into consideration when 
conceptualizing a humanitarian intervention. Introducing 
massive aid in an SSTR environment inevitably sets the 
stage for competitiveness and distrust. Elements of game 
theory contribute to an understanding of competitiveness 
and its impact on reciprocity in the conceptual framework. 
In humanitarian interventions, the well-heeled 
civilian and military outsiders possess the “means of 
production” (to borrow a Marxist take on capital) and 
therefore have the capacity and the incentive, as well as 
the mandate, for initiating reciprocity with the 
population. The population, typically subdivided along 
competitive ethnic lines, does not possess the means of 
production and have little incentive to cooperate with 
their enemies, but they have strong incentive to cooperate 
                     
7 Gouldner, 161. 
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with the deep-pocketed interventionists. This is why the 
relationships among the ethnicities prior to the 
intervention resemble the low “Defect / Defect” payoff in 
the 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 2).  
Interventionists apply their time, energy and considerable 
resources to shift the dynamic of this zero-sum game to 
“cooperate / cooperate.” 
 
Figure 2.   The 2-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Competing ethnicities may establish a mutually 
beneficial cycle of reciprocity or compete to each other’s 
detriment.8 The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (PD) helps to explain 
the initial social dynamic between well-heeled 
interventionists (the “Haves”) and one ethnicity (the “Have 
Not”). Recipients of aid may either cooperate with the 
interventionist or defect. SSTR scenarios typically involve 
more than one ethnicity, so the dynamic assumes the 
complexity of an “n-player game”.9 
                     
8 F. Vega-Redondo, Economics and the Theory of Games, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 1-2. The values assigned in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma are arbitrary and thus subject to debate. The principle of 
















 The explanatory power of this simple model is that it 
accounts for a 2-player subset of the competitive dynamic 
in an SSTR environment. This competitive dynamic is an 
integral component of the conceptual framework of this 
thesis. Groups will always be in competition with each 
other in the real world. Interventionists must be prepared 
to contend with the competitive zero-sum dynamic in place, 
and engineer cooperation between competing ethnicities.  
D. ACKNOWLEDGED WEAKNESSES 
As with all models (simplified explanations of real 
life phenomena), there are downsides. In Figure 2, the 
potential drawback to cooperation for the “have nots” 
(e.g., the survivors of an ethnic conflict whose basic 
service infrastructure—electricity, sanitation, schools, 
roads and bridges—have been destroyed) is the imposition of 
political and social imperatives by the “haves.” Given the 
mandate of such key aid players as the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, 
such imperatives are an inevitable political price tag of 
intervention. If the incentive for cooperation does not 
exceed the incentive for defection, the interventionists 
(the military in particular) may be called on to coerce the 
population into cooperation, hazarding a cycle of negative 
reciprocity and creating more defection than cooperation. 
Another potential weakness to any conceptual framework 
or model, even something as basic as the PD, is the set of 
cultural assumptions underlying the model. If the 
conditions are right, mutual cooperation between the 
“haves” and the “have nots” seems a given, since the “have 
nots” have apparently nothing to lose by cooperating—or do 
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they? Nonconsensual interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were predicated on an anticipated cycle of reciprocity with 
the liberated and overwhelmingly grateful citizens. 
Unfortunately, this critical strategic assumption proved 
incorrect. A surprisingly diverse network of “have nots” in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated a willingness to 
forego development and defect. Whether this was a result of 
the military alienating the population by harsh treatment 
is not clear. Not all defected, but sufficient numbers 
turned to make the entire Western interventionist 
enterprise a gamble.  
The inevitable resistance aside, anecdotal evidence 
suggests the possibility of establishing a positive cycle 
of reciprocity in a hostile environment (as is the case 
with negative reciprocity): Iraqi soldiers and police 
hazarding themselves with their American partners in joint 
patrols, multiple ethnicities forming joint committees to 
deal with municipal problems, etc.10 Apparently, it is 
possible to generate bridging social capital from existing 
networks, if the security requirement has been met.11 Trust 
is the coin of the realm in SSTR, and cooperation—a key 
component of social capital—is a manifestation of trust 
earning dividends. But nothing printed, said, or broadcast 
will carry any weight unless the message is corroborated by 
deeds. This is how the cycle of reciprocity is initiated 
and maintained—by deeds. COL Ralph Baker, a brigade 
commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, noted that 
                     
10 M. Gordon, "101st Airborne Scores Success in Reconstruction of 
Northern Iraq," New York Times 4 (2003). 
11 “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs” is considered in chapter six 
as a societal template. Security is a fundamental human and social 
need. 
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winning “trust and confidence” was a more achievable 
strategy than winning “hearts and minds.” 12 
As will be seen in the “Village of Hope” case in 
Chapter IV, use of the generously funded Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) enabled tactical units to 
initiate a cycle of reciprocity with the population in 
Mosul, Iraq.13 Microfinancial CERP initiatives throughout 
the battlespace served notice to the Iraqi population that 
their erstwhile invaders intended to improve relations 
through municipal and humanitarian projects. This is the 
same approach taken in Afghanistan.  The challenge in such 
projects is to accelerate the cycle of positive reciprocity 
ahead of the enemy’s cycle of negative reciprocity. It is 
not the project itself, but the bridging relationships 
fostered and sustained among the social groups that 
matters. 
The cycle of reciprocity generated by CERP should 
reach what Malcolm Gladwell calls the “tipping point;” 
namely, the point where an idea becomes contagious and 
spreads like the plague. Gladwell’s three “agents of 
change” are: “The Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor and 
the Power of Context.”14 Gladwell’s idea applies to the 
conceptual framework of this thesis in that the “few” 
represent the “true believers” (connectors, mavens and 
                     
12 "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's 
Perspective on Information Operations Military Review." Available from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_3_86 /ai_n16689751/pg_1, 
accessed May 10, 2007. 
13 Author’s experience in Iraq, JAN 2004-JAN 2005 includes spending 
one million dollars in a six-month cleanup program in Mosul, Iraq. CERP 
enabled immediate cash financing of everything from trash cleanup to 
pothole repair. 
14 M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make a Big 
Difference, Little, Brown and Company, 2000): 19. 
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salesmen) among the military and civilian interventionists; 
the “stickiness factor” is the irresistibility of the 
message transmitted by the deeds of the interventionists; 
the “power of context” is the “golden hour” after a 
conventional war has been won and where the greatest 
opportunity to influence a docile population exists.15 
interventionists striving to achieve a tipping point in a 
host nation population (and looking for an exit strategy) 
should do so through an accelerated cycle of reciprocity 
that incorporates all three of Gladwell’s agents of change.  
The norm of reciprocity has a down-side. A competing 
cycle of negative reciprocity emerges among those opposed 
to the agenda of the humanitarians. Reciprocity never takes 
place in a vacuum: a positive outcome between 
interventionists and indigenous groups can be a negative 
outcome for “dark networks” operating—and profiting—outside 
the bounds of local and international law. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the author will acknowledge the potential 
of negative reciprocity but will focus on what is required 
to initiate a positive cycle of reciprocity and generate 
social capital between interventionists and indigenous 
groups, and among the indigenous groups themselves. 
The following chapter will examine the literature of 
social capital. 
 
                     
15 The “Golden Hour” is known in military circles as the hour 
immediately after a soldier is wounded. If the soldier is given combat 
lifesaver treatment and medically evacuated within that hour, his or 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. EVOLUTION OF DEFINITIONS 
Definitions of social capital and the conceptual 
framework of this thesis draw on a number of dynamic 
sociological, economic and military schools of thought. Not 
all schools of thought are in agreement as to the 
substance, effects or application of social capital. This 
chapter will examine the main streams of thought on social 
capital and conclude with the author’s identification of 
the major elements that facilitate the development of 
social capital. 
“Social capital” is a cross-disciplinary concept that 
has received attention from schools of thought running the 
gamut from sociologists and network theorists to 
economists.16 The appeal of social capital is that it puts 
the emphasis on social relations, a factor that tends to be 
ignored in SSTR interventions. Social capital goes beyond 
mere fiscal, physical or human capital—the stuff brought to 
SSTR in great abundance but with little forethought on 
their social and relational consequences.  
An early pioneer in social capital thought, the French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defined social capital as  
…the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition.17 
                     
16 P. S. Adler and S. W. Kwon, "Social Capital: Prospects for a New 
Concept," The Academy of Management Review 27, no. 1 (2002): 17-18. 
17 P. Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (1986): 248. 
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James Coleman, a catalyst in modern social capital 
thought, lays the American foundation for the concept with 
an emphasis on network structure and utility:  
Social capital is defined by its function. It is 
not a single entity, but a variety of different 
entities having two characteristics in common: 
They all consist of some aspect of social 
structure, and they facilitate certain actions of 
individuals who are within the structure.18  
Francis Fukuyama expands on Coleman’s definition to 
include norms:  
I prefer to define the concept more broadly to 
include any instance in which people cooperate 
for common ends on the basis of shared informal 
norms and values.19 
Again, in the Third World Quarterly:  
…social capital is an instantiated informal norm 
that promotes co-operation between two or more 
individuals… …trust, networks, civil society, and 
the like, which have been associated with social 
capital, are all epiphenomenal, arising as a 
result of social capital but not constituting 
social capital itself.20 
A key author disagrees with Fukuyama’s ideas on what 
constitutes social capital. Building on the idea of norms, 
Robert Putnam, who gained recognition by examining a 
perceived decline in social capital in the United States, 
provides this earlier referenced description of social 
capital as “features of social organization such as 
                     
18 J. S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, Belknap Pr, 1990), 
320. 
19 F. Fukuyama, "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda," 
SAIS Review 22, no. 1 (2002): 23. 
20 F. Fukuyama, "Social Capital, Civil Society and Development," 
Third World Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2001): 7. 
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networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate 
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”21  
The definitions proffered by these four authors 
indicate the challenge in applying an idea such as social 
capital to SSTR: nobody agrees on any single definition—
social capital is many things to many people. Bourdieu and 
Coleman emphasize the structure of relationships and the 
facility derived therein, while Fukuyama and Putnam stress 
the norms inherent in the structure. While features of all 
four authors’ views are applicable, Robert Putnam’s SSTR-
friendly view of social capital proves the most functional.  
For the purpose of this thesis, social capital must be 
further subdivided between bonding social capital and 
bridging social capital. Robert Putnam explains this 
dichotomy:  
Bonding social capital brings together people who 
are like one another in important respects 
(ethnicity, age, gender, social class, and so 
on), whereas bridging social capital refers to 
social networks that bring together people who 
are unlike one another.22 
It must also be noted in these definitions that not 
all social capital is positive. Bonding social capital may 
be found in tightly knit organizations with very negative 
externalities, such as Hezbollah, Al Qaeda or the Mafia. 
Bonding social capital also tends toward exclusion and in-
group/out-group dynamics.  
The final definition to be considered is the “cycle of 
reciprocity.” Reciprocity itself is “a mutually contingent 
                     
21 R. D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital," 
Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 67. 
22 R. D. Putnam, Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital 
in Contemporary Society, Oxford Univ Pr, 2002): 11. 
 16
exchange of benefits between two or more units.”23 This 
definition contains an implied warning against what 
Gouldner calls the “Pollyanna Fallacy,” namely, that 
gratitude always follows the bestowal of a benefit.24 The 
norm of reciprocity is a standard feature of any human 
network and a critical component of social capital. It has 
both positive aspects (a mutual exchange of benefits, 
advantages, money, information, generating trust with each 
successful iteration) and negative aspects (a downward 
spiral of tit-for-tat, eye-for-an-eye, generating 
distrust). The challenge of civilian and military 
interventionists—and a topic of interest in this thesis—is 
to help competing entities generate trust by initiating and 
sustaining a positive cycle of reciprocity. If a positive 
cycle of reciprocity is initiated, sustained and enforced 
between competing actors in an SSTR environment (Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Post-Tsunami Aceh, etc.), then 
intuitively one may assume that other such cycles may be 
initiated at various levels in the population.  
What has been written to date on the various forms of 
capital (social, human, physical, fiscal, political, 
artistic, etc.) is voluminous and continues to grow.25 
Military SSTR doctrine, while experiencing a prodigious 
growth rate in recent years, has not kept pace with this 
growing body of literature. The gap between contemporary  
 
                     
23 A. W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary 
Statement," American Sociological Review 25, no. 2 (1960): 164. 
24 Ibid. 
25 G. L. H. Svendsen and G. T. Svendsen, "On the Wealth of Nations: 
Bourdieuconomics and Social Capital," Theory and Society 32, no. 5 
(2003): 609. 
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thought on social capital and military lessons learned in 
SSTR presents an opportunity for practical civil-military 
synthesis and application. 
Before proceeding, the line must be drawn between 
social capital and human capital. Both forms of “capital” 
are essential elements of stabilization operations, but 
they are not one and the same. An understanding of both 
types of “capital” is a starting point for applying these 
useful metaphors. 
A Nobel Prize-winning economist, Gary S. Becker, 
provides his perspective on human capital: 
…economists regard expenditures on education, 
training, medical care, and so on as investments 
in human capital. They are called human capital 
because people cannot be separated from their 
knowledge, skills, health, or values in the way 
they can be separated from their financial and 
physical assets.26 
Human capital is the focus of considerable 
humanitarian energy expended by military civil affairs, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
their host nation partners. The civil and military lessons 
learned since the fall of the Soviet Union (and examined in 
the Kosovo and Mosul cases in Chapters IV and V) suggest 
that the human capital cart is being put before the social 
capital horse. Initiatives to build and sustain human 
capital (or any other form of capital) must be founded on 
and between existing social capital networks.  
                     
26 Gary S. Becker, "Human Capital". The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., ed. David R. Henderson, 
2002. [Online] available from http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ 
HumanCapital.html, accessed October 15, 2006. 
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Pierre Bourdieu deserves credit for his groundbreaking 
work on material and non-material forms of capital.27 
Bourdieu was the first to synthesize two schools of 
capital, bridging the tangible world of economics (the 
world on which many interventionists—particularly military—
focus) with the intangible world of sociology.28 Bourdieu’s 
work, in French, did not achieve the widespread popular 
appeal of other proponents of social capital. 
Social capital first became popularized among American 
sociologists by prominent sociologist James S. Coleman’s 
influential essay, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital” (1988). The author used high school dropout 
statistics to illustrate the impact of social capital 
(family, friends and community organizations) on successful 
and unsuccessful human capital initiatives.29 Dr. Coleman 
explained his challenge in synthesizing the economic and 
sociological schools of thought by addressing what he 
called “two intellectual streams.” Sociologists use such 
exogenous factors as social networks to explain levels of 
economic performance, while economists place strong 
emphasis on the very rational and endogenous constant of 
“maximizing utility.” Coleman reinforced his synthesis of 
these two streams of thought with four useful examples of 
social capital: the wholesale diamond market in New York 
City, radical student activists in South Korea, parents 
moving from Detroit to Jerusalem to improve their 
children’s social network at school, and the highly-
                     
27 P. Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (1986): 43. 
28 Svendsen, Bourdieueconomics, 616. 
29 J. S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," 
The American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): 97. 
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networked Kahn el Khalili market in Cairo.30 
Interventionists dealing with SSTR challenges can identify 
with the sociological parallels in these cases. James 
Coleman’s seminal effort established the conceptual 
framework within which numerous economists, sociologists 
and other interested academics have attempted to correlate 
social networks and levels of economic activity. 
Robert Putnam’s frequently-referenced “Bowling Alone: 
America’s Declining Social Capital” pays homage to 
Coleman’s work and then expands upon the idea of social 
capital being a precursor to regional economic success: 
Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership 
in choral societies and football clubs—these were 
the hallmarks of a successful region. In fact, 
historical analysis suggested that these networks 
of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity, 
far from being an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic 
modernization, were a precondition for it.31 
Dr. Putnam’s study of northern and southern Italy 
yielded valuable insights into the role of social capital 
in the economic success of local governments.32 
Extrapolating from these results, the author presents a 
compelling use of the concept of social capital in 
explaining the decline of civic engagement in America. 
Due to Putnam’s ground-breaking work in Italy, both he 
and Coleman emerge as cornerstone references for 
contemporary (post-2000) treatments of the concept of 
social capital. Some have built upon Putnam’s observations 
                     
30 J. S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," 
The American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): 98-100. 
31 R. D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 65. 
32 R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Y. Nanetti, "Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy," (1993). 
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after September 11th, comparing the surge in social 
solidarity with the civic revival that followed World War 
II.33 Such resurgence is challenging in a peacetime context. 
Dr. Francis Fukuyama builds on both Coleman and Putnam 
as yet another advocate for the study and application of 
the concept of social capital. He is by no means in 
agreement with these two authors, presenting 
counterbalancing definitions and applications of the 
concept of social capital. Dr. Fukuyama defines social 
capital as “an instantiated informal norm that promotes 
cooperation between two or more individuals.”34 Positive and 
negative externalities characterize the various 
manifestations of social capital. Dr. Fukuyama points to 
both the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia as unfortunate examples 
of groups with highly developed norms but with strong 
negative externalities.35  
Fukuyama’s intuitive “radius of trust” resonates well 
with the ideas of Putnam, Coleman and Bourdieu. Dr. 
Fukuyama noted a tendency of groups with particularly 
strong internal norms, such as the Marine Corps or the 
Mormon Church, to constrict their radius of trust vis-à-vis 
outsiders.36 
An additional challenge identified by this author is 
the translation of the idea of social capital into policy. 
Authors from numerous disciplines are in disagreement as to 
the very definition of social capital, let alone the 
                     
33 P. Quesenberry, "Bowling Together during War," YALE LAW JOURNAL 
111, no. 4 (2002): 1031-1038. 
34 Fukuyama, Social Capital, Civil Society and Development, 7. 
35 Ibid., 8. 
36 Ibid., 15. 
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application of that concept to sound fiscal policy.37 
Fukuyama notes that microfinancial initiatives by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries 
have met with some measure of success in generating social 
capital at the local level.38 
Fukuyama’s ideas complement those of Coleman and 
Putnam by identifying two important catalysts for the 
generation of social capital: religion and globalization.39 
Religion as a source and catalyst for social capital 
finds numerous advocates in the literature. Dr. Andrew 
Greeley of the University of Chicago is an outspoken critic 
of the Putnam school, calling the generalized warnings of a 
decline in social capital “pop sociology” and “fuzzy 
thinking.”40 Greeley presented compelling data on the 
dropout rates between religious and secular schools, 
linking his findings with Coleman’s original empirical 
study of high school dropout rates. Students who had 
“multiplex” relationships (i.e., “closure” or overlapping 
networks of parents, friends and community organizations—
particularly the church) stood a better chance of 
graduating school than those with “simplex” relationships.41 
Taking the knowledge management approach, Dr. Mark 
McElroy (co-authoring with Rene’ J. Jorna and Jo van 
Engelen) makes the following observation: “Social capital 
consists of knowledge and organizational resources that 
                     
37 "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda," SAIS Review 
22, no. 1 (2002): 23, 34. 
38 Ibid., 33. 
39 Fukuyama, 19. 
40 "Coleman Revisited: Religious Structures as a Source of Social 
Capital," The American Behavioral Scientist 40, no. 5 (1997): 589. 
41 Ibid. 
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enhance the potential for individual and collective action 
in human social systems.”42 McElroy et al consider trust, 
norms, beliefs, rules and networks to be manifestations of 
knowledge that complement both Coleman’s and Putnam’s 
perspectives on social capital. Of these manifestations, 
networks receive the most attention in the social capital 
literature. Together, these five analytical elements 
(trust, norms, beliefs, rules and networks) constitute what 
McElroy calls “social innovation capital.”43 This 
distinction underscores the importance of knowledge and 
capacity for innovation as a metric for social capital 
rather than network linkages alone. 
Ronald S. Burt of the Business School at the 
University of Chicago stresses the network aspects of 
social capital and underscores the burgeoning literature on 
the topic.44 Taking the business approach to the social 
capital metaphor, Burt argues that competitive advantage 
may account for “structural holes” between organizations: 
The hole argument begins with a generic research 
finding in sociology and social psychology: 
information circulates more within than between 
groups (e.g., within a work group more than 
between groups, within a division more than 
between divisions, within an industry more than 
between industries).45 
Network structures account for why certain individuals 
and groups perform better than others. Those who position 
                     
42 "Rethinking Social Capital Theory: A Knowledge Management 
Perspective," Journal of Knowledge Management 10, no. 5 (2006): 125. 
43 Ibid., 132. 
44 R. S. Burt, "The Network Structure of Social Capital," Research in 
Organizational Behavior 22, no. 2 (2000): 83-92. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
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themselves at the “structural holes” provide connectivity 
and add value to their network.46 Social capital 
entrepreneurs who prove adept at brokering information 
within and between groups not only improve the 
effectiveness of their organizations but tend to get 
promoted faster than their less-connected coworkers.47 
Burt’s study of structural holes has application in 
education as well as business and has the explanatory rigor 
to aid in the understanding of civil networks in 
stabilization operations. 
The literature makes the connection with stabilization 
operations by discussing microenterprise initiatives in 
poverty-stricken areas. Michael Woolcock of the World Bank 
examined social capital as a form of group collateral for 
recipients of micro loans.48 Diffusion of risk among 
densely-connected groups proved to be an effective 
technique for economic stimulus based on his field work in 
India and Bangladesh.49 Woolcock also drew on the work of 
Coleman, Putnam, Burt and Fukuyama in his discussion of 
bonding within groups and bridging between groups. 
Ethnic identity is an important subset of the 
literature. Examination of Jimy Sanders’ “Ethnic Boundaries 
and Identity in Plural Society” yields further 
understanding of the concept of “closure” in networks.50 
                     
46 R. S. Burt, "The Network Structure of Social Capital," Research in 
Organizational Behavior 22, no. 2 (2000): 77. 
47 Ibid., 73. 
48 M. Woolcock, "Microenterprise and Social Captial: A Framework for 
Theory, Research, and Policy," The Journal of Socio-Economics 30, no. 2 
(2001): 194. 
49 Ibid. 
50 J. Sanders, "Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies," 
Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 330. 
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While Coleman sees “closure” as overlapping networks that 
reinforce positive social capital, Sanders warns of the 
“down-side” of closure in that “bounded solidarity” may 
strengthen bonding social capital to the detriment of 
bridging social capital.51 Identifying ethnic networks as 
sources of both social and human capital enables consensus 
engineers such as military civil affairs and non-
governmental humanitarian organizations to promote 
collaboration between organizations and prevent isolation. 
Sanders illustrated how the church frequently becomes 
a “hub of social organization” wherein religious identity 
can trump ethnic identity.52 He is in agreement with Greeley 
and Coleman regarding the role of religious affiliation in 
generating volunteerism, collaboration and other forms of 
social capital. An interesting phenomenon regarding the 
religious assimilation of immigrants is the growing 
Protestantism of the Hispanic population in the United 
States.53 
The literature of social capital has demonstrated an 
enthusiastic growth since Coleman’s popular 1988 article. 
The ubiquitous metaphor and concept of social capital has 
found adherents in both sociological and economic circles. 
Common themes running through the literature include the 
empirically significant impact of religious affiliations on 
education; the difference between bonding within groups and 
bridging between groups (structural holes) and the economic 
impact of simplex versus multiplex relationships. The 
                     
51 J. Sanders, "Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies," 
Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 331. 
52 Ibid., 344. 
53 Ibid. 
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literature also has a significant counterbalance of voices 
declaring “social capital” to be a convenient and nebulous 
catch-all for the general decline in civic mindedness in 
the United States.  
The literature represented in this review seems to 
indicate that the explanatory power of social capital may 
be applied to the challenges of bridging ethnic division in 
military stabilization operations. The gap in the 
literature between the rising interest in social capital 
and the current Global War on Terrorism (with its economic 
overtones) is a fertile ground for doctrinal synthesis. 
Before addressing the methodology of the thesis in the 
next chapter, the reader must keep in mind that the 
determinants of social capital (e.g. common projects, 
“networks of networks” that emerge from these projects and 
the norms of reciprocity that the groups use to govern 
their interactions in networks) are not the same thing as 
social capital. The reservoir of good will and the 
willingness to contribute resources in a positive 
relationship constitute social capital, while the apparatus 
that generates the capital (networks, projects, etc.) must 
be examined separately.54 This dichotomy will be 
demonstrated in the Kosovo and Iraq case studies. 
The next chapter will explain the methodology of the 
thesis. 
 
                     
54 Social Capital. Answers.com. Investopedia, Investopedia Inc., 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a comparative case study design to 
examine two cases in which the author was personally 
involved: the Gnjilane, Kosovo Harvest Initiative, August-
September, 1999 and the Mosul, Iraq “Village of Hope” 
project, February-June, 2004. 
Data collection and analysis in this thesis rely on 
qualitative methods. Quantitative methodology differs from 
qualitative methodology in that the researcher applies 
statistical tests to numerically quantified results. 
Qualitative methodology places emphasis on interpretations 
of experience.55 The comparative case study design drives 
the research narrative and analysis in the following 
chapters.  
The data collection process relies on three sources: 
interviews, archival research and participant observation. 
In both case studies, the author worked with and 
interviewed commanders, operations officers, media 
representatives and engineers in daily contact with the 
indigenous populations. These personnel sources were 
selected based on their availability, credibility and 
proximity to the cases. The archives on both cases are 
limited to Department of Defense press releases, newspaper 
accounts and two separate case studies.56 The author’s 
experiences in two countries in two separate military 
                     
55 G. A. Cross et al., "Thinking and Rethinking Research 
Methodology." Business Communication Quarterly 59, no. 3 (1996), 1. 
56 Lundberg’s “Accidental Statesman” (Mosul, Iraq) and Holohan’s 
“Networks of Democracy” (Kosovo) are excellent sources of contextual 
information but neither goes into detail on the two specific cases in 
this thesis. 
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operations, coupled with archives and interviews, provides 
ample primary and secondary sources from which to generate 
hypotheses on the development of bridging social capital 
under SSTR conditions. 
Participant observation is both a strength and 
limitation in that it carries the author’s useful but 
limited frame of reference. Interviews and archival 
research serve as quality control measures, but inevitably 
carry an element of bias in the questions asked and sources 
consulted by the author. All three data sources for this 
thesis will be integrated as objectively as possible. 
Perfect objectivity is unrealistic and the potential for 
bias increases significantly when one has personal 
experience in a case in question. Acknowledging that one’s 
limited perspective may be tinged with bias is a necessary 
step toward credibility.  
The very structure of the research design has an 
impact on the analysis. Both authors and students of 
comparative case studies understand that historical events 
are unique products of their sociological, political and 
economic context. Events that occur at one point in time 
and space may translate to another location at another 
time, but never perfectly. The analysis of the Kosovo and 
Iraq cases will demonstrate congruence and incongruence, 
convergence and divergence. The two cases enable a fuller 
examination of intervention strategies and the development 
of hypotheses. 
 Although the methodology used in this thesis does not 
use quantitative statistics, a recommended “way ahead” in 
Chapter VI includes a follow-up analysis of Gnjilane, 
Kosovo and Mosul, Iraq and other locations. Such follow-up 
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will enable us to test the hypotheses of social capital and 
reciprocity developed in this thesis. This “grounded 
theory” approach and the resulting hypotheses may be thus 
tested using other research designs and methods in the 
future.  
 For the purpose of this thesis, bridging social 
capital will be operationalized by three criteria: 
observable participation, observable cooperation and the 
formation of inter-group agreements of norms of reciprocity 
and behavior. With these criteria, the author asks in both 
cases: Who participated in the projects, why did they 
participate, and how did they work out cooperation with 
competing ethnicities? The answers to these questions will 
help determine if social capital had been generated between 
competing groups. 
 The following chapter will discuss what happened in 
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IV. WHAT HAPPENED: TWO SOCIAL CAPITAL CASES 
 The following case studies encompass the author’s 
experience and knowledge in two useful examples of 
initiating a cycle of reciprocity and the development of 
bonding and bridging social capital. The unique 
relationships and circumstances discussed here will be 
analyzed, compared and contrasted in the next chapter.  
A. THE HARVEST INITIATIVE, GNJILANE, KOSOVO 
In July 1999, the author’s four-man Civil Affairs 
Team-Alpha (CAT-A) from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was 
assigned to 1-26 Infantry in Camp Monteith, Gnjilane, 
Kosovo.57 The Gnjilane sector lay within the larger American 
sector and consisted of sixteen villages and a number of 
smaller hamlets. These communities were divided among a 
shifting demographic of (in order of population density) 
Albanian, Serbian, and Roma (“Gypsy”) ethnicities.58 The 
Civil Affairs team spent the first month learning the 
leadership of the local area and fulfilling its mandate of 
keeping the civilians out of the way of the military and 
keeping the military from unduly inconveniencing the host 
nation population.59 
It became apparent after talking to leaders of the 
Serbian and Albanian communities (the Roma had no center of 
                     
57 "Camp Monteith," [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-monteith.htm, 
accessed March 9, 2007. 
58 "Kosovo," in Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia [database online]. 
[cited 2007]. Available from ttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kosovo?oldid= 
123036887, accessed May 11, 2007.  
59 C. A. Operations, "FM 41-10," Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, February (2000): 1-5. 
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gravity or representation per se) that the summer wheat 
harvest was in jeopardy. Approximately 6,000 hectares of 
wheat, equivalent to nearly 15,000 acres, was in danger of 
going to waste due to a stand-off between Albanian and 
Serbian farmers. Neither side trusted the other enough to 
go into adjacent fields to work. The same month that the 
Civil Affairs team arrived, a 12-year-old Serbian boy was 
shot and killed—presumably by Albanians—while riding with 
his father on a tractor. Distrust was extremely high and 
ran both ways during this time of reverse ethnic cleansing 
and retribution. A survey of the Serbian enclaves revealed 
that they possessed most of the farm equipment. The 
Albanians claimed that their own farm equipment had been 
confiscated and given to the Serb villages during the 
Serbian incursion (winter ’98–spring ‘99).60 
The Civil Affairs Team Sergeant and Team Leader 
conceived of an idea: a joint Serbian and Albanian project 
to harvest the summer wheat. The Team Sergeant further 
recommended using military fuel as an incentive for the 
farmers.61 After proposing the idea to the battalion 
operations officer, the team traveled to the villages in 
the Gnjilane region to organize the first meeting. Such a 
meeting would require a neutral location, so the team 
organized the meeting at the Gnjilane gymnasium in August, 
1999. Approximately twenty representatives agreed to attend 
the meeting, divided evenly between Serbian and Albanian 
villages. 
                     
60 Wikipedia, Kosovo. 
61 Mark Eubanks SGM, US Army Sergeants Major Academy, FT Bliss, TX, 
telephone interview with author, 9 April 2007. 
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The Civil Affairs Team Leader and Team Sergeant 
facilitated the meeting with Serbian and Albanian 
interpreters present. The 1-26 Infantry battalion 
operations officer occupied the head table and related 
comparative anecdotes about farming in Oklahoma. Media 
representatives at the meeting included a reporter from the 
LA Times.62 
During the course of the meeting, one Albanian 
representative shouted angrily, “I refuse to talk to these 
men. They killed my brother.”63 The team had to work through 
this outburst to present a plan for sharing equipment and 
getting the wheat harvested. The team identified such raw 
emotion as a potential risk in an initial meeting and 
ensured KFOR had the only arms at the meeting. Engineering 
consensus under such circumstances is difficult but not 
impossible. Relationships with functional trust and 
reciprocity, as the team learned, take time and patience in 
SSTR operations. Turbulence is part of the process. 
Clearly, the norm of reciprocity between ethnicities would 
have to be subjugated for the time being to the norm of 
reciprocity between the interventionists and the mixed 
Kosovo population, obviously locked in a tit-for-tat 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 2, p. 7). The team managed to 
mediate this icebreaker by allowing the Albanian man a 
chance to vent his spleen briefly to a docile Serbian 
audience (wisely so, as the Serbs were outnumbered), then 
                     
62 Valerie Reitman, "Kosovo Harvest Yields Bounty of Ethnic 
Mistrust," Los Angeles Times (1999): 1. It must be noted that the 
author of the article credited the battalion operations officer with 
the CAT-A’s work, for which the officer later apologized.  
63 The author’s anecdotes are personal observations and one of the 
three “triangulating” sources for the case study. 
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tactfully expressing genuine regret for the recent 
injustices and then getting on with the business of the 
wheat harvest. 
The Harvest Summit lasted approximately two hours due 
to the Serbian and Albanian interpreter mediation. The 
United States military used a “quality control” interpreter 
from New York to ensure indigenous translations were 
accurate (biased local interpreters plagued the CA Team’s 
efforts in Kosovo). The substance of the meeting focused on 
very mundane issues, such as who had what wheat fields, who 
had what equipment, and who was willing to cooperate. The 
team and 1-26 Infantry reiterated the offer of free fuel to 
participants. This was not a trivial offer in a region 
where the United Nations embargo had driven up the price of 
a liter of black market fuel.64  
Gaining the tentative cooperation of the meeting 
attendees was the goal. This was by no means certain, as it 
was the first meeting between Albanians and Serbians in the 
American sector since the NATO occupation. The team gained 
the verbal acknowledgement of the attendees and word spread 
of the initiative. The commander of the American sector, 
Brigadier General Craddock, held forth the initiative as an 
example of incentivized cooperation.65  
In the weeks that followed, the Civil Affairs team 
oversaw the distribution of several thousands of gallons of 
                     
64 "Situation Reports: Balkans, Kosovo Crisis Fact Sheet # 94," 
[cited 2007].  Available from http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/ 
AllDocsByUNID/47d6da5d6e3323da852567b5006f80e2, accessed April 10, 
2007. 
65 "DefenseLink News Transcript: Brig. Gen. Craddock, News Briefing 
Aug 5, 1999, 2:00 p.m." [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid 
=391, accessed April 3, 2007. 
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NATO low-grade diesel fuel. Participants in the Harvest 
Initiative were entitled to fill their farm equipment and 
so get on with the business of harvesting the wheat under 
the watchful eye of platoons from 1-26 Infantry. During the 
fuel distribution, the Civil Affairs team used the 
opportunity to check serial numbers on the tractors that 
lined up for fuel, to compare them with papers of ownership 
provided by Albanian farmers. In the village of Pasjane, 
over one hundred and twenty tractors lined up for fuel, 
most with the serial number plates forcibly removed. The 
CAT-A managed to return one tractor and wagon to the 
neighboring Albanian village of Vlastica, where only weeks 
earlier a forensics team identified the remains of thirteen 
village males massacred by Serbian militia.66 
As a result of the fuel incentive, the Serbians 
harvested all their wheat, while scattered instances of 
Serbians harvesting their Albanian neighbors’ wheat was 
reported. The team observed an interesting dynamic taking 
place at the Gnjilane silos which indicated that not all 
relationships within the population had been severed by the 
war. 
The author’s Civil Affairs team accompanied Serbian 
wheat wagons to the silos in Gnjilane, and witnessed 
Albanian workers rejecting wet Serbian wheat. The author 
discovered through his 19-year-old Albanian interpreter 
that the Serbian farmers knew the Albanian man who operated 
the silo, and accepted his judgment (with some bickering). 
Wet wheat would cause rot and mildew in the silo, so the 
                     
66 "War Crimes in Kosovo," [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0011
985, accessed April 26, 2007. 
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team watched as the Albanian silo operator carefully 
examined every farmer’s wagon, Serbian and Albanian alike. 
When the Serbians witnessed Albanians getting the same 
treatment that day, they were mollified. 
The author’s Civil Affairs Team departed Kosovo one 
month after the Harvest Summit in Gnjilane. Before the 
team’s redeployment to the United States in September, it 
appeared that most of the wheat had been harvested. Talks 
were in the works to arrange the planting of the winter 
wheat (the seed of which would be donated by the 
interventionists) in accordance with the agricultural cycle 
of the region. 
The Harvest Initiative will be analyzed in the 
following chapter, using the “bridging social capital” 
conceptual framework. The companion case, the “Village of 
Hope” in Mosul, Iraq demonstrates another effort to bring 
competing ethnicities together for the common good. 
B. THE “VILLAGE OF HOPE,” MOSUL, IRAQ. 
 What became a showcase project in Northern Iraq 
started out as a training project for Iraqi ex-military in 
desperate need of marketable civilian skills and 
employment. The author observed a cycle of reciprocity 
developing among Iraqi laborers and between the Iraqi 
laborers and the Americans. 
 The 926th Engineer Construction Group of Montgomery, 
Alabama supported the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) 
Division’s effort in Mosul, Iraq. The Engineers, under the 
direction of Design Engineer LTC Richard Ott, started the 
“House of Hope” project to teach out-of-work military 
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personnel new marketable construction skills.67 The project, 
which took place over a period of approximately eight 
months (June ’03 to February ’04), expanded into the 
“Village of Hope” and resulted in a multi-ethnic cadre of 
laborers trained in numerous house-building disciplines 
(carpentry, plumbing, masonry, etc.). The physical results 
of their labors were eighteen houses built in the Ghazlani 
area of Mosul, at the destroyed headquarters of Saddam 
Hussein’s 5th Corps. The social capital results of this 
project were strengthened relations with the Americans, 
while inter-ethnic relations appeared to have at least 
stabilized during the eight-month project.68 Within the work 
place, the mixed ethnic work force performed admirably. As 
a result of the laborer’s cooperation and hard work, 
eighteen families received houses—a mixture of Muslim, 
Kurdish, Arab, and Turkomen ethnicities—totaling 135 people 
and ranging in ages from pre-born to seventy-one.69 
 The commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Major 
General David Petraeus, hosted a ceremony on February 2nd, 
2004 with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in 
attendance. Several months of teaching and building came to 
fruition as the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense  
 
 
                     
67 "DefenseLink News Article: Village of Hope Points to Future of 
Iraq," [cited 2007].  Available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ 
newsarticle.aspx? id=27392, accessed April 3, 2007. 
68 Inter-ethnic violence increased during these eight months, but not 
between the Kurdish, Turkomen and Arab members of the Village work 
force. 
69 Ibid. Major General Petraeus’ efforts in Mosul were also captured 
in Kirsten Lundberg’s Harvard Case Study, which listed the seminal 
“House of Hope.” The “Village of Hope” also is mentioned in her case 
study “epilogue.” 
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handed certificates of ownership to the eighteen families, 
stating he hoped the Village of Hope would eventually 
become the “City of Hope.”70  
 That week, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 
was relieved by the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort 
Lewis, Washington and “Task Force Olympia” (approximately 
80 personnel from I Corps, FT Lewis, Washington) as part of 
the country-wide Operation Iraqi Freedom II changeover.71  
The Ghazlani area and the “Village of Hope” became the 
responsibility of the new unit. With less than half the 
personnel of the 101st Airborne Division, Task Force Olympia 
and the 3/2 Stryker Brigade monitored the Ghazlani area and 
the “Village of Hope.” The operations officer for 1-23 
Infantry (eventually becoming the Brigade operations 
officer), Major Chuck Hodges, discovered that Governor 
Kashmoula of Nineveh Province had selected families not 
based on need, but apparently out of political favor. The 
operations officer evicted the residents and redistributed 
the houses to homeless in the Ghazlani area.72 
The work force that had trained and performed so 
admirably under LTC Ott’s engineers dispersed and 
presumably sought other means of employment. Efforts by the 
Stryker Brigade to expand the Village of Hope were 
frustrated by zoning restrictions dictated from Baghdad, 
and a very creative and promising test bed of bridging 
social capital came to a halt. 
                     
70 C. Escoto, ""Village of Hope" Ready for Inhabitants," Clarksville 
Leaf-Chronicle, February 6 2004.  
71 "Multinational Force Iraq," in Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia 
[database online]. [cited 2007]. Available from http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/multinational_force_iraq?oldid=126459379, accessed April 3, 2007. 
72 Author’s conversations with the operations officer and evicted 
residents, April-June, 2004. 
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V. INTERPRETATION, COMPARISON AND CONTRAST 
A. KOSOVO HARVEST INITIATIVE: INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS 
The impact of the political-military context of this 
case cannot be overstated. Actions on both sides of the 
conflict resonated in the minds of the Kosovars at the time 
of the Harvest Initiative: the grievous actions of Serbian 
forces gave the Albanians a vengeful mindset while NATO’s 
ouster of Slobodan Milosovic’s Serbian forces set KFOR 
(Kosovo Force) at odds with the Serbian enclaves. Kosovo 
Serbians initially proved less willing to cooperate with 
the civilian and military interventionists while the 
Albanians (and the Kosovo Liberation Army in particular) 
went through great lengths to align themselves with KFOR. 
The interventionists—the author included—discovered the 
framework of intervention to be highly competitive, with 
the Serbians and Albanians occupying the “distrust-
distrust” low-payoff quadrant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
The military considered the environment “permissive,” 
meaning that the operating environment was conducive to 
reconstruction and humanitarian aid, even though host 
nation law enforcement was being reconstituted and not in 
control of the populace.73 
Establishing a cycle of reciprocity—even in a 
permissive environment—required an initial investment of 
goodwill and trust. Somebody has to take the first step, 
and it is usually the interventionist. Repeated visits by 
the author’s Civil Affairs team with both Albanian and 
                     
73 Operational Environment. Answers.com. Military and Associated 
Words, US Department of Defense, 2003. http://www.answers.com/topic/ 
operational-environment, accessed April 30, 2007. 
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Serbian villages in the Gnjilane sector enabled the team to 
develop rapport with village leadership. Key leaders in 
both Albanian and Serbian villages represented the 
“bonding” social capital within and between the families of 
the villages, with no apparent “bridging” social capital 
between villages of different ethnicities.74 This lack of 
“bridging” social capital represented an opportunity for 
creative consensus engineering.  
The author’s Civil Affairs team and numerous platoon-
sized elements from KFOR (1-26 Infantry Battalion, 
commanded by LTC Robert E. Scurlock, Jr.) initiated the 
first attempt at fostering “bridging” social capital 
between communities since the beginning of the Serb 
incursion the previous year. Aggressive social networking 
between villages led to a successful proposal to village 
representatives, who reluctantly agreed to a “Harvest 
Summit.” The key incentive for Serbian and Albanian 
participants was the offer of free fuel to participating 
farmers, courtesy of Brigadier General Craddock at Camp 
Bondsteel.75 The offer of fuel was made to village leaders 
prior to the Summit. The village leaders took the Civil 
Affairs team at its word, demonstrated good faith and 
attended the Summit. The Civil Affairs team wasted no time 
making good on their offer: 1-26 Infantry provided a fuel 
truck that week and the Americans gained favor and 
cooperation with the local farmers. This is bridging social 
                     
74 K. Agnitsch, J. Flora, and V. Ryan, "Bonding and Bridging Social 
Capital: The Interactive Effects on Community Action," JOURNAL-
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY 37, no. 1 (2006): 36.  
75 DefenseLink, Craddock. 
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capital in its purest form: good will deposited in the bank 
of human relationships held for later withdrawal. 
The atmosphere of grievance and distrust made generous 
incentives imperative. Wielding metric tons of supplies 
gives interventionists compelling leverage in a post-war 
environment. The Harvest Summit represented an opportunity 
to bring together competing ethnicities under the same roof 
with civilian and military interventionists, who commanded 
significant leverage in the form of raw financial and 
material aid. Simply giving the resources to the villages 
without obligating the villages to a degree of cooperation 
would have proven wasteful and would have run contrary to 
the agenda of UNMIK, which was to establish self-
sufficiency and set the conditions for democracy.76  
The “carrot and stick” approach worked exceptionally 
well in this constrained environment. The interventionists 
had abundant supplies which the competing Serbs and 
Albanians desperately required. Access to these 
humanitarian supplies (dry goods, UNHCR tents, school 
materials, donated clothing, etc.) was a compelling 
incentive to at least reciprocate with the 
interventionists, if not with the competing ethnicity.77 
Both Serbians and Albanians remained entrenched in their 
villages and needed a common project to bring them into the 
same room. The Civil Affairs team had access to resources 
desired by both sides by virtue of the team’s working 
relationship with numerous humanitarian organizations in 
                     
76 A. Holohan, Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, Stanford University Press, 2005): 174-
175. 
77 The Interventionist / Single Ethnicity “cooperate-cooperate” 
paradigm  
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the Gnjilane sector. These humanitarian actors included the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
World Food Program, USAID, Doctors Without Borders, and 
Mother Teresa. (While these organizations were stakeholders 
in the outcome of the harvest, they did not take part in 
the meeting or the implementation, but aided those with no 
crops with direct food assistance).  The military also 
brought considerable security and transportation resources 
which complemented the non-military resources in sector. 
Anne Holohan observed the dynamic networking potential of 
civilian and military interventionists: 
In Kosovo, the militaries, the UNCA, NGOs, and 
democratization organizations such as the OSCE 
are enmeshed in alliances and linkages that 
eschew centralized control and correspondingly 
enhance flexibility and adaptability to local 
situations.78 
Essentially, the interventionists had to first learn 
how to network with each other before they could network 
with the population. Reciprocity, trust and good will had 
to thrive to a degree between the civilian and military 
interventionists before such civil relations could be 
encouraged between the Serbians and Albanians. 
Competitiveness exists among interventionists, who are 
bound by organizational constraints and motivated by 
organizational imperatives to get the job done, sometimes 
at the expense of other organizations. 
The relationship established between the Civil Affairs 
team, the village representatives and the humanitarian 
actors in the theater became a form of social capital that 
facilitated the Harvest Initiative. The level of trust 
                     
78 Holohan, 175. 
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developed between the Civil Affairs team and the indigenous 
leadership was such that the leaders were willing to take a 
small, tentative step toward compromise. The compromise 
took the form of (1) sitting in the same building as their 
enemy and (2) the Serbians pledging harvest support for 
their less-equipped Albanian neighbors in return for free 
diesel fuel. 
The harvest consisted of hauling the wheat to the 
silos in downtown Albanian-controlled Gnjilane. The 
author’s Civil Affairs team accompanied Serbian truckloads 
of wheat to the silos and observed the Albanian silo 
manager inspecting the wagons of wheat and rejecting the 
wet wheat. The Serbians, understandably aggravated at 
having wheat rejected, accepted the judgment of the silo 
manager. The farmer community was small, and these 
gentlemen apparently knew each other before the war. This 
pre-existing bridging social capital made the team’s task 
of mediating business agreements much easier. Identifying 
such relationships during interventions can give civilian 
and military organizations considerable leverage in 
brokering inter-group agreements. 
B. “VILLAGE OF HOPE,” MOSUL, IRAQ: INTERPRETATION OF 
EVENTS 
 The increasingly non-permissive environment of Mosul 
and the reduction of forces in February ’04 adversely 
impacted the well-intentioned “Village of Hope.” LTC Ott’s 
926th Engineers originally anticipated building 100 houses 
rather than eighteen.79 The hazardous environment 
                     
79 "Engineers Teach Iraqis Construction, Build `Village of Hope'," 
[cited 2007]. Available from http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_ 
id_key=5256, accessed May 8, 2007. 
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notwithstanding, the prior Iraqi military, consisting of 
mixed ethnicities and trained in new construction skills, 
demonstrated a work ethic that CW2 Nathan Harvel said 
rivaled American crews.80 This is an interesting bridging 
social capital phenomenon in a population working on a site 
that only a few months before had been bombed by the United 
States. The need for meaningful employment overrode the 
population’s tendency to shun the occupying forces. By 
answering the engineers’ summons for trainees, the Iraqi 
ex-military, representing Kurdish, Turkomen and Arab 
ethnicities, joined the workforce in a first step toward 
post-war normalcy. 
 The organization of the project demonstrated great 
human and financial capital finesse. Not only did the 926th 
Engineers provide employment for a particularly sensitive 
segment of the population (out-of-work military personnel), 
but those personnel were taught critical reconstruction 
skills, a tangible take-away from their time with United 
States military personnel. The bridging social capital in 
this situation could be measured by (1) the number of 
indigenous personnel working with the Engineers 
(approximately 20), and (2) the level of reciprocity 
demonstrated by the workers in the form of honest labor. 
The author toured the houses with LTC Ott and met the labor 
force. It was evident from the completed houses and the 
attitude of the work force that the American engineers were 
onto something worthwhile. The laborers were turning in an  
 
 
                     
80 Defenselink, Village. 
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honest day’s work for an honest day’s wage and actually 
trusted the American military to fulfill their end of the 
wage bargain. 
 After the eighteen families occupied the houses and 
Task Force Olympia and the 3/2 Stryker Brigade settled into 
the area, it became evident that the Nineveh Provincial 
Governor at the time, Dr. Usama Kashmoula, had selected the 
Village of Hope families based on political favor rather 
than need.81 In one instance, the male head of a family 
drove up to the ceremony in what appeared to be a Mercedes 
to claim the keys to his free house.82 Also, the location of 
the “Village” proved to be problematic for the troops who 
replaced the 101st Airborne. Hundreds of homeless Iraqis had 
taken up residence in the bombed out barracks of Saddam’s 
defunct 5th Corps and witnessed the housing being erected 
literally within yards of their hovels. The demarcation 
between the “haves and have nots” had never been so 
pronounced.  
Although the Stryker Brigade attempted to address this 
gulf with more housing, zoning restrictions dictated from 
Baghdad prevented an ambitious and well-intentioned 
expansion of the Village of Hope. MAJ Hodges, who 
eventually became the operations Officer for the 3/2 
Stryker Brigade, could not add to what the 101st had already 
built, due to those bureaucratic barriers. Iraqi elections 
in June 2004 prevented military zoning decisions such as 
those taken by the 101st in the fall of 2003. 
                     
81 Interview with Stryker commander, 7 August 2006, Fort Ord, CA. 
82 Interview with Stryker Operations officer, 3/2 Stryker Brigade, 
June 2004. 
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The judgment call of the leadership on the ground 
could not be second-guessed: the Village of Hope, initiated 
with the best of intentions and initially generating 
observable bridging social capital among multi-ethnic 
laborers and between Americans and Iraqis, succumbed to 
political machinations beyond the American’s control. 
Further manifestations of social capital among the multi-
ethnic Iraqi work force could not be verified and is a 
potential subject for follow-on study. 
C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. 
 Three similarities between these cases bear 
examination: (1) the incentive for reciprocity, (2) 
relationship building and (3) initiation of the cycle of 
reciprocity. These three dimensions suggest a way ahead for 
interventionists that goes beyond mere distribution of 
humanitarian aid to the engineering of new inter-group 
networks. 
The common denominator of both of these cases involved 
initiating a cycle of reciprocity. The interventionists had 
to convince multiple competing ethnicities to cooperate 
with each other for the greater good. A hefty incentive had 
to be used in both cases to get the ethnicities to work 
together. Although the level of investment in Kosovo and 
Iraq were substantially different (less than 15,000 gallons 
of low-grade diesel fuel to Serbian and Albanian farmers 
compared to the human capital training and approximately 
$10,000 invested in labor and material per house in Mosul, 
Iraq), both instances of reciprocity began with a material 
boost of one form or another. The desperate employment and 
economic situation in both Kosovo and Iraq made competing 
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ethnicities exceptionally willing to accept the initial 
“investment in reciprocity” from the interventionists.  
 The second similarity, relationship building, occurred 
in both cases first between the interventionists and the 
indigenous population. After that, tentative relationships 
became apparent among the rival ethnicities. In Kosovo, 
both Serbian and Albanian farmers “voted with their feet” 
and participated in the Harvest Summit in the Gnjilane 
gymnasium. This was a manifestation of bridging social 
capital between the Civil Affairs team and the leadership 
of the villages demonstrating trust in the arbitrating 
Americans. In Iraq, LTC Rich Ott and his engineers managed 
to pique the interest of the Iraqi ex-military who also 
“voted with their feet” and learned reconstruction skills 
on the site of a US bombing, in spite of the Kurdish / 
Turkomen / Arab mix of the work force. Relationships 
developed that lasted the eight month duration of the 
project and produced eighteen houses. Again, the duration 
of these relationships beyond the duration of the project 
is a suggested subject for further study. It may be 
hypothesized that the working relationship of the laborers 
may have sufficient momentum to manifest itself elsewhere. 
A third similarity between the two cases is the 
initiation of a cycle of reciprocity. The competing 
ethnicities in both cases required a common end to which 
they could strive and focus their attention—a litmus test 
for trust. For the Kosovars it was the wheat, and for the 
Iraqis it was a common need for post-war employment skills 
and houses for the homeless. Both these cases involved 
pressing needs requiring collective effort. Initiating a 
cycle of reciprocity through a common project enabled the 
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interventionists to establish a speedy, profitable 
relationship with hostile elements. The Serbs witnessed 
their countrymen driven out of Kosovo with NATO bombs, yet 
proved receptive to the author’s Civil Affairs team after a 
few weeks of dialogue and the offer of fuel. LTC Richard 
Ott’s engineers managed to gain the interest of several 
out-of-work Iraqi ex-military just a few months after the 
cessation of combat action. This unique social phenomenon 
could be labeled as “collaboration” in the pejorative 
wartime sense of the term, but in both cases cooperation 
with the interventionists proved worthwhile ventures for 
both Serbs and Iraqis. Both population groups accepted this 
reciprocal relationship with military and civilian 
interventionists and in so doing demonstrated a willingness 
to reciprocate with other ethnic groups. 
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO CASES. 
Three elements differentiated these two cases: the 
security environment, the level of distrust and political 
interference.  
The security environment varied considerably between 
Gnjilane, Kosovo and Mosul, Iraq. From a social capital 
perspective, generating trust when adequate security is 
lacking is an exercise in frustration. The permissive 
environment in Kosovo enabled a two-vehicle Civil Affairs 
team to move about the Gnjilane sector freely, enabling 
open lines of communication between villages and 
humanitarian elements. Not one American was killed in the 
US sector in Kosovo during the author’s tour (July-
September ’99). Developing “bridging” social capital 
between competitive but relatively non-violent social 
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networks in Kosovo became a matter of how fast the 
interventionists could move from town to town rather than 
if they could move. 
In contrast, by November 2003, the 101st and its 
supporting engineers in Iraq had already begun to 
experience violent resistance. In the 101st Airborne’s 
deadliest month, Two 101st soldiers were shot dead and 
stripped by a mob near the Ministry of Oil, just minutes 
from the Village of Hope.83 To the everlasting credit of the 
101st and its supporting engineers, these military 
interventionists persevered in the face of stiffening 
resistance and completed eighteen houses by February 2004. 
Completion of the project required a preponderance of 
military presence to protect the workers (proximity played 
a role here: the Ghazlani area was on the border of the 
Mosul airfield and within rifle shot of the airfield 
garrison). Bridging social capital developed in this 
project in terms of people willing to work and cooperate 
with their American employers, but only at the cost of 
heavy military presence. Bridging social capital developed 
to a small degree between the laborers themselves in that 
they demonstrated a willingness to work together for the 
duration of the project. Job security makes for strange 
bedfellows, overriding the exclusionary social bonds of 
families and tribes and bridging groups for the duration of 
the project. In the short term, the bridging social capital 
generated by the project manifested itself in the laborer’s 
willingness to continue working with each other. In the 
                     
83 K. Lundberg, "The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the 
City of Mosul, Iraq (Case Program no. C15–06–1834.0)," Boston: Harvard 
University, Kennedy School of Government Case Program (2006), 51. 
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long term, the question for follow-on research is: do such 
bonds survive the project and give rise to residual 
cooperation and trust?84  
The level of distrust in the Kosovo case was much 
higher than that in the Mosul case. In the Kosovo case, the 
Serbians were passively sympathetic to the ethnic cleansing 
of Milosevic’s forces and passive witnesses—and in some 
cases, alleged participants in—a horrendous slaughter of 
Albanians. The village representatives at the Harvest 
Summit despised each other. In Mosul, the ethnicities 
involved did not demonstrate the palpable hatred and 
distrust toward each other that the author witnessed in 
Kosovo. This was a curious difference that may be accounted 
for by Saddam’s brutal repression of any manifestation of 
inter-ethnic conflict. In the early days of the liberation, 
the Iraqi citizenry had greater reason to distrust the 
Saddam Fedeyeen and former regime loyalists than the 
Americans. Liberation from Sunni oppression may have 
accounted for the level of trust and cooperation 
demonstrated between LTC Ott’s engineers and the Iraqi ex-
military laborers. 
The final contrast, political interference, figured 
prominently in the Mosul case, but was conspicuously absent 
in the Kosovo case. In Kosovo, the military and civilian 
interventionists had free reign to take the measures 
necessary to initiate a cycle of reciprocity between the 
Serbians and Albanians. In Mosul the Provincial Governor, 
Dr. Usama Kashmoula, stopped expansion of the Village of 
                     
84 The same question may be asked of the “Arizona Market” in Bosnia: 
do the market relationships between Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims 
transcend the marketplace or is cooperation a localized phenomenon? 
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Hope project, citing zoning restrictions dictated from 
Baghdad.85 Gov. Kashmoula also dictated the recipients of 
the free homes, which proved problematic in the months 
following the 101st Airborne’s redeployment.86 Political 
circumstances in Kosovo facilitated social capital, while 
the circumstances in Mosul militated against it. 
The final chapter will provide conclusions and 
recommendations for designing an intervention strategy in 
SSTR that fosters a cycle of reciprocity among competing 
populations. 
                     
85 Hodges, June 2004. Governor Kashmoula was assassinated on July 14, 
2004 in a convoy heading to Baghdad. 
86 The original recipients of the houses petitioned the author for a 
redress of their grievances when they were ousted from their houses to 
make room for homeless families already living in the bombed buildings 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The two case studies presented in this thesis indicate 
a need for an intervention strategy based on a cycle of 
reciprocity that generates bridging social capital. It is 
the author’s conclusion that the cycle of reciprocity 
generated in Gnjilane, Kosovo and Mosul, Iraq caused an 
observable change in relationships between competing 
ethnicities. It is the challenge of the interventionists to 
not only initiate, but sustain the cycle of reciprocity. 
The approach to both problems involved an incentive-
based cycle of reciprocity initiated by the 
interventionists with each of the competing ethnicities. 
The interventionist then initiated a project with cross-
ethnic appeal (wheat, housing). The competing ethnicities 
in turn demonstrated a degree of cooperation with each 
other during the course of the projects. This two-step 
approach to reciprocity is an incremental method of 
building trust between competing groups (Figure 3).  




Initiates Cycle With 
Each Ethnicity 






Reciprocity is the first step in the long process of 
reconciliation. 
So there is a pressing need to address that 
negative relationship. Not to make enemies love 
each other, by any means, but to engender a 
minimum basis of trust so that there can be a 
degree of cooperation and mutual reliance between 
them. To achieve this, they need to examine and 
address their previous relationship and their 
violent past. Reconciliation is the process for 
doing exactly that.87 
The Harvest Summit in Gnjilane, Kosovo and the Village 
of Hope in Mosul, Iraq did not result in observable, 
spontaneous external interaction between Serbian and 
Albanian families. Such results may be quantified in 
follow-on research. What the projects did result in was 
initial positive relationships with the interventionists 
and a working arrangement that placed competing and 
distrustful ethnicities in working proximity of each other. 
Competing ethnicities worked together for the common civic 
good—helping neighbors to harvest the summer wheat and 
training ex-military to build houses. The interventionists 
observed by the author deserve the highest praise for their 
efforts—efforts which provide three key reciprocity and 
bridging social capital lessons for future SSTR operations. 
These lessons are  
(1) Bridging social capital begins with reciprocity 
between interventionists and competitive ethnicities;  
(2) Reciprocity requires an initial conditional 
investment; 
                     
87 D. Bloomfield, T. Barnes, and L. Huyse, Reconciliation After 
Violent Conflict: A Handbook, International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, 2003) 
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(3) Bridging social capital requires continual 
maintenance or it will depreciate (the “shadow of the 
future” must not be visible to competitive ethnicities for 
an interactive Prisoner’s Dilemma to remain cooperative.) 
Social capital must be fostered between competing 
social networks for security, stabilization, transition and 
reconstruction initiatives to succeed. An initial 
investment of diesel fuel and personal communications and 
relationships in Gnjilane, Kosovo and an initial investment 
of human capital, financial capital and personal 
relationships in Mosul, Iraq resulted in the formation of 
hybrid networks—ad hoc test beds of trust and reciprocity 
that had the potential of becoming more permanent and 
profitable associations. If civilian and military 
interventionists carefully engineer the reciprocity between 
competing groups, new networks may be expected to arise 
almost out of sheer necessity. The bridging social capital 
resulting from new networks (e.g., norms of reciprocity and 
trust between opposing families, tribes, ethnicities) will 
depreciate if not actively maintained by institutionalizing 
and rewarding those relationships in the emerging civil 
society.  
With the foregoing conclusions in mind, intervention 
strategies in SSTR operations require a different approach 
to Maslow’s Hierarchy (Figure 4).  
Modern SSTR efforts assume a “Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Human Needs” when applying intervention strategies. 
Maslow’s Hierarchy is a classic theory of personal 
motivation that has explanatory power beyond the personal 
level. Abraham Maslow’s theory is based on a seemingly 
intuitive prioritization of human needs progressing with 
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the most fundamental physiological needs (food, water, 
shelter, security) to social needs (sense of belonging, 
love, etc.) to more advanced psychological needs of 
personal attainment. Collective action in a society takes 
place in the context of personal needs. Human nature 
dictates, and Abraham Maslow would concur, that people will 
tend to their (and especially their children’s) more 
pressing personal needs (food, water, safety) before moving 
on to higher social needs. Bridging social capital does not 
even become a factor in Maslow’s hierarchy until the basic 
needs are at least temporarily satisfied. 
The experiences of the author in the two case studies 
suggest that Maslow’s Hierarchy may be used as a societal 
template, but the intervention strategy needs to occur at 
the mid-point of the hierarchy rather than the bottom, with 
humanitarian aid contingent on participation in 
reciprocity-generating projects.  
In a sense, this thesis argues that applying Maslow’s 
Hierarchy at the individual level is an ineffective 
approach to societal intervention. Interventionists assume 
a Maslow-like approach to intervention and tend to bring 
prodigious quantities of aid into a stricken region without 
considering the existing social networks or their inherent 
dynamics. By tending to the existing sources of bonding 
social capital (such as that encountered at the grain silo 
in Gnjilane, Kosovo), interventionists may initiate the 
cycle of reciprocity more efficiently than simply 




Figure 4.   Maslow’s Hierarchy as a Societal Template88 
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Positive and negative reciprocity are indicated on the 
Maslow template by the two sets of cyclic arrows, traveling 
in opposite directions (Figure 3). Establishing positive 
reciprocity with a population to meet their basic needs 
sets the stage for higher forms of trust and reciprocity. 
The intervention strategy should be designed to address the 
basic physical and security needs, but only in the context 
of existing social groups. To do otherwise is to simply 
introduce material goods into a needy society without 
developing the lasting capacity to work together to produce 
their own goods. 
Operationalizing social capital in SSTR requires an 
understanding of where social networks fit in society’s 
hierarchy of needs. The following recommendations are a 
hypothesized “way ahead” for civilian and military 
interventionists. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following “Network Intervention Design Criteria” 
should be adapted to SSTR planning cycles: 
1. Cross-Group Representation. New networks formed 
in the early stages of SSTR must have cross-ethnic 
representation for the development of bridging social 
capital. Demographic surveys yield possible leads on group 
representation and reduce grievance with the 
interventionists. 
2. Equitable Distribution of Resources. Impartiality 
is a prerequisite for both initiating and sustaining the 
cycle of reciprocity. If cross-ethnic representatives 
perceive bias in the system, parties will at best withdraw 
participation from the initiative, and at worst initiate a 
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negative cycle of reciprocity. A simple metric for this 
criterion is transparent accounting of where the various 
forms of aid are going, and informing the parties 
accordingly. Apportionment of aid can also serve as a 
disincentive for uncooperative behavior (“carrot and 
stick”).  
3. Value-added Networking. Participants must derive 
a tangible benefit from the intervention strategy. In the 
Kosovo case, the tangible benefit was not only the diesel 
fuel for the tractors, but also the salvage of the 8,000 
hectares of wheat. The value-added for the ex-Iraqi 
military was a civilian skill and a paycheck.  
4. Population Ownership. A final criterion for 
designing an intervention strategy is demonstrable 
ownership of the project. Ad hoc networks will generate a 
reservoir of good will if all members of the network have a 
vested interest in the outcome of the project. 
The metrics for these design criteria should go beyond 
the typical “1,000 schools built, 2,000 tons of 
humanitarian rations distributed,” etc. The metrics should 
also include, but not be limited to: 
(1) Cross-group representation in municipal jobs 
(medical, law enforcement, education, etc.);   
(2) External associations that develop as a result of 
group projects (e.g., civic organizations, neighborhood 
watch groups), and 
 (3) Leadership nodes with cross-ethnic representation. 
This final metric is a critical indicator that 
interventionists have implemented a successful transition 
and reconstruction strategy. Indigenous leadership that  
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gains the trust and confidence of a cross-section of the 
population will enable the interventionists to transition 
out of the theater. 
 In summary, the forces that engage in security, 
stabilization, transition and reconstruction operations 
must approach such challenges from a social capital 
perspective. Building capacity in a post-war environment 
means more than just shipping tons of humanitarian aid into 
the region. The civilian and military interventionists, 
once they have a working relationship established among 
themselves, must seek out the existing sources of social 
capital in the host nation population and engineer 
reciprocity between competing groups. Such a cycle, if 
sustained, can generate “bridging” social capital and 
create new, more effective relationships within the 
population.
 61
LIST OF REFERENCES 
"Camp Monteith." [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-
monteith.htm, accessed March 9, 2007. 
"Coleman Revisited: Religious Structures as a Source of 
Social Capital." The American Behavioral Scientist 40, 
no. 5 (1997): 587. 
"DefenseLink News Transcript: Brig. Gen. Craddock, News 
Briefing Aug 5, 1999." [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.transc
ript.aspx?transcriptid=391, accessed April 3, 2007. 
"DefenseLink News Article: Village of Hope Points to Future 
of Iraq." [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2739
2, accessed April 3, 2007. 
"Engineers Teach Iraqis Construction, Build `Village of 
Hope'." [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5256, 
accessed May 8, 2007. 
"Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies." 
Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002a): 327. 
"Kosovo." in Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia [database 
online].  [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kosovo?oldid=123036887, 
accessed May 11, 2007. 
"Microenterprise and Social Capital: A Framework for 
Theory, Research, and Policy." The Journal of Socio-
Economics 30, no. 2 (2001): 193.  
"Multinational Force Iraq." in Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia [database online].  [cited 2007]. Available 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/multinational_force 
_iraq ?oldid=126459379, accessed April 3, 2007. 
“Operational Environment.” Answers.com. Military and 
Associated Words, US Department of Defense, 2003. 
http://www.answers.com/topic/operational-environment, 
accessed April 30, 2007. 
 62
"Rethinking Social Capital Theory: A Knowledge Management 
Perspective." Journal of Knowledge Management 10, no. 5 
(2006): 124. 
"Situation Reports: Balkans, Kosovo Crisis Fact Sheet # 
94." [cited 2007].Available from http://www.reliefweb 
.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/47d6da5d6e3323da852567b500
6f80e2, accessed April 10, 2007. 
“Social Capital.” Answers.com. Investopedia, Investopedia 
Inc., 2000. http://www.answers.com/topic/social-capital, 
accessed May 10, 2007. 
"Testimony as Delivered to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the Transition in Iraq," U.S. Department of 
Defense Speeches, 25 June 2004 [database on-line]; 
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a= o&d=5007384420, 
accessed April 26, 2007. 
"The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's 
Perspective on Information Operations Military Review." 
Available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0PBZ/is_3_86/ai_n16689751/pg_1, accessed May 10, 
2007. 
"War Crimes in Kosovo." [cited 2007]. Available from 
http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Pa
rams=M1ARTM0011985, accessed April 26, 2007. 
Adler, P. S., and S. W. Kwon. "Social Capital: Prospects 
for a New Concept." The Academy of Management Review 27, 
no. 1 (2002): 17-40. 
Agnitsch, K., J. Flora, and V. Ryan. "Bonding and Bridging 
Social Capital: The Interactive Effects on Community 
Action." JOURNAL-COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY 37, no. 1 
(2006): 36.  
Becker, Gary S., "Human Capital". The Concise Encyclopedia 
of Economics. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., ed. 
David R. Henderson, 2002. [Online] available from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html; 
accessed October 15, 2006; Internet. 
Bloomfield, D., T. Barnes, and L. Huyse. Reconciliation 
After Violent Conflict: A Handbook. International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003.  
 63
Bourdieu, P. "The Forms of Capital." Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education (1986): 241-258.  
Burt, R. S. "The Network Structure of Social Capital." 
Research in Organizational Behavior 22, no. 2 (2000): 
345–423. 
Coleman, J. S. Foundations of Social Theory. Belknap Pr, 
1990.  
Coleman, J. S. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital." The American Journal of Sociology 94 (1988): 
95-120.  
Cross, G. A., C. S. David, M. B. Graham, and C. Thralls. 
"Thinking and Rethinking Research Methodology." Business 
Communication Quarterly 59, no. 3 (1996). 
Directive, D. D. "3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, 
Security." Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations 28 (2005). 
Escoto, C., ""Village of Hope" Ready for Inhabitants," 
Clarksville Leaf-Chronicle, February 6, 2004. 
Field Manual 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”  
Headquarters, Department of the Army, February (2000). 
Fukuyama, F. "Social Capital, Civil Society and 
Development." Third World Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2001): 7-
20.  
Fukuyama, F. "Social Capital and Development: The Coming 
Agenda." SAIS Review 22, no. 1 (2002b): 23. 
Gladwell, M. The Tipping Point: How Little Things can make 
a Big Difference. Little, Brown and Company, 
2000.Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital and Development: 
The Coming Agenda." SAIS Review 22, no. 1 (2002): 23.  
Gordon, M. "101st Airborne Scores Success in Reconstruction 
of Northern Iraq." New York Times 4 (2003). 
Gouldner, A. W. "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary 
Statement." American Sociological Review 25, no. 2 
(1960): 161-178. 
 64
Holohan, A. Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond. Stanford University 
Press, 2005.  
Lundberg, K. "The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus 
and the City of Mosul, Iraq (Case Program no. C15–06–
1834.0)." Boston: Harvard University, Kennedy School of 
Government Case Program (2006). 
Maslow, A. H. "A Theory of Human Motivation." Psychological 
Review 50, no. 4 (1943): 370-396. 
Putnam, R. D. "Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social 
Capital." Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78.  
Putnam, R. D. Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social 
Capital in Contemporary Society. Oxford Univ Pr, 2002.  
Putnam, R. D., R. Leonardi, and R. Y. Nanetti. "Making 
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy." 
(1993). 
Quesenberry, P. "Bowling Together during War." YALE LAW 
JOURNAL 111, no. 4 (2002): 1031-1038.  
Reitman, V. "Kosovo Harvest Yields Bounty of Ethnic 
Mistrust." Los Angeles Times (1999): 1.  
Svendsen, G. L. H., and G. T. Svendsen. "On the Wealth of 
Nations: Bourdieuconomics and Social Capital." Theory 
and Society 32, no. 5 (2003): 607-631.  
Sztompka, P. Trust: A Sociological Theory. Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
Vega-Redondo, F. Economics and the Theory of Games. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.  
 65
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Ferdinand Irizzary 
 95th Civil Affairs Brigade 
 Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
 
4. James D. Anderson 
 Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) 
 Hurlburt Field, Florida 
 
5. Garry Reid 
 ASD/SOLIC 
 The Pentagon 
Washington, D.C. 
 
6. Richard Balladares 
 SOCOM J-7 
 MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
 
7. HQ USSOCOM Library 
 MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 
 
 
 
 
 
